Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth by Zalabardo, José L.
Disputatio, Vol. VIII, No. 43, November 2016
Received: 19/07/2016
Reflective Knowledge
and the Nature of Truth
José L. Zalabardo
University College London
BIBLID [0873-626X (2016) 43; pp. 147-171]
Abstract
I consider the problem of reflective knowledge faced by views that 
treat sensitivity as a sufficient condition for knowledge, or as a major 
ingredient of the concept, as in the analysis I advance in Scepticism and 
Reliable Belief. I present the problem as concerning the correct analysis 
of SATs — beliefs to the effect that one of my current beliefs is true. 
I suggest that a plausible analysis of SATs should treat them as neither 
true nor false when they ascribe truth to a non-existent belief. I ar-
gue that the problem is inescapable if we construe SATs as ascribing 
the property of truth to a belief. Deflationism manages to avoid the 
problem of reflective knowledge, but it does so by violating alethic 
priority — the principle that our account of representation must be 
built on our account of truth. I argue that we can avoid the problem of 
reflective knowledge while preserving alethic priority with a pragma-
tist account of truth — according to which truth is explicated in terms 
of the rules that govern the practice of assessing judgments and related 
items as true or false.
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1 Sensitivity and reflective knowledge
If a subject S believes a proposition p, let’s say that S’s belief that p is 
sensitive, or that S sensitively believes that p, just in case the following 
subjunctive is true: if p were false, S wouldn’t believe that p.
Let me refer as self-ascriptions of truth (SATs) to beliefs of the form 
my belief that p is true, where p is a proposition that I believe now.
On the face of it, SATs can’t be sensitive. If I believe that p, then 
I will believe that my belief that p is true whether or not it is as a 
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matter of fact true. So long as I believe that p, my propensity to 
believe that my belief that p is true will not be affected by the truth 
value of p.
Consider now the view that sensitive belief is a necessary con-
dition for knowledge, to which I’m going to refer as the Sensitivity 
Constraint (SC):
SC: If S doesn’t believe that p sensitively, then S doesn’t know 
that p.
If SATs can’t be sensitive, then, according to SC, they can’t be 
knowledge either. I can never know that my beliefs are true. This is 
an implausibly radical sceptical outcome. Since SC appears to make 
this outcome unavoidable, we have a very powerful reason for reject-
ing SC. This is what’s come to be known as the problem of reflective 
knowledge for SC.
The problem has been developed in some detail by Jonathan 
Vogel. He uses the following example:
You see your long-time friend Omar, who is a perfectly decent and 
straightforward sort of person. Noticing his shiny white footwear, you 
say, “Nice shoes, Omar, are they new?” Omar replies, “Yes, I bought 
them yesterday.” I think the following things are true:
(10) You know Omar has a new pair of shoes.
(11) You know that your belief that Omar has a new pair of shoes is 
true, or at least not false. (Vogel 2000: 609-10)1
Vogel argues that SC is incompatible with (11), since you don’t 
sensitively believe that your belief that Omar has a new pair of shoes 
is true, or at least not false:
As things actually are, you believe that your belief that Omar has new 
shoes is not false. What if it were? If somehow your belief that Omar 
has a new pair of shoes were false, you would still believe that your be-
lief was true, not false. The alternative is hard to fathom. It is difficult 
to conceive of your not believing that something you believe is true, 
whenever the matter happens to cross your mind. So, if your belief that 
1 Vogel had already raised the problem in Vogel 1987: 203. See also DeRose 
1995: 22-23, Sosa 1999: 145.
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Omar has new shoes were false, you would still believe that your belief 
was true, not false. (Vogel 2000: 610)
He spells out the argument using a particular analysis of SATs. 
If O stands for the proposition that Omar has a new pair of shoes, 
and B(p) for the proposition that you believe that p, then, on Vogel’s 
analysis, the proposition ‘your belief that Omar has a new pair of 
shoes is true, or at least not false’ has the following structure:
~(B(O) ∧ ~O)
I.e. it is the proposition that it’s not the case that you believe O but O 
is false, or that you don’t believe O falsely.
Assume that you believe O and ~(B(O) ∧ ~O). In order for your 
belief in ~(B(O) ∧ ~O) to be sensitive, it’s got to be the case that in 
the nearest world W in which ~(B(O) ∧ ~O) is false you don’t believe 
~(B(O) ∧ ~O). But this condition, Vogel argues, cannot be satisfied. 
In W, ~(B(O) ∧ ~O) is false, and hence B(O) ∧ ~O is true. A fortiori, 
in W, B(O) is true. But “[i]f you believe O, you believe that you do 
not falsely believe O” (Vogel 2000: 611). Hence, in W, you believe 
~(B(O) ∧ ~O). Therefore your belief that ~(B(O) ∧ ~O) is not sensi-
tive. It follows that, according to SC, you can’t know ~(B(O) ∧ ~O). 
Vogel finds this outcome unacceptable and invokes it to justify his 
rejection of SC.
Joe Salerno has recently attacked Vogel’s argument for its reli-
ance on the principle that if you believe that p, then you believe that 
you don’t falsely believe that p. Call this principle Reflection. Salerno 
writes:
[…] it is not obvious that believing p entails the higher-order belief that 
one is not mistaken in believing p. That implies that small children and 
other unreflective thinkers have beliefs about their own beliefs. More 
to the point, no contradiction flows from the assumption that there 
is a thinker who, for whatever reason, is able to form only first-order 
beliefs (i.e., beliefs that do not have the concept of belief as part of their 
content). (Salerno 2010: 75)
Vogel does indeed invoke Reflection at a crucial step in his argu-
ment, and Salerno’s concerns are compelling. However, if we con-
cede to Salerno that believing that p doesn’t entail believing that you 
don’t falsely believe that p, the argument still goes through. Bear in 
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mind that we are investigating the epistemic status of your belief 
~(B(O) ∧ ~O). The question that we are asking is: is this belief sensi-
tive? For this we need to consider whether you would have the belief 
in the nearest world W in which it is false, i.e. in the B(O) ∧ ~O-world 
that most resembles the actual world. Vogel uses Reflection in sup-
port of his claim that in W you believe ~(B(O) ∧ ~O). He derives this 
conclusion from the premise that W is a B(O)-world using Reflection. 
However, I want to argue that this is an unnecessary detour. We are 
assuming that in the actual world you believe ~(B(O) ∧ ~O). It fol-
lows that you will also believe ~(B(O) ∧ ~O) in W unless the changes 
that need to be made to the actual world to turn it into a B(O) ∧ ~O-
world would remove your belief that ~(B(O) ∧ ~O). But there is no 
reason to think this. Hence we can obtain the conclusion that you 
believe ~(B(O) ∧ ~O) in W, and hence that your actual belief that 
~(B(O) ∧ ~O) is not sensitive, without invoking Reflection.2
Kelly Becker has shown that Vogel’s result depends on his spe-
cific construal of SATs — as beliefs of the form that you don’t falsely 
believe that p, rather than of the form that you believe that p truly 
(Becker 2006). Suppose that we analyse the proposition ‘your belief 
that Omar has a new pair of shoes is true, or at least not false’ as hav-
ing the following structure:
B(O) ∧ O
Assume that you believe that O and that B(O) ∧ O. Is the latter belief 
sensitive? To answer this question we need to consider whether you 
would have the belief in the nearest world W in which it is false, i.e. 
in the nearest ~(B(O) ∧ O)-world.
In W, we have that either ~B(O) or ~O. Let’s consider each case in 
turn. Suppose first that in W ~B(O) — you don’t believe that Omar 
has new shoes. Since you don’t believe O in W, it follows that you 
don’t believe B(O) ∧ O either. Suppose now that in W ~O — Omar 
doesn’t have new shoes. Now, since W is a ~O-world and the nearest 
~(B(O) ∧ O)-world, it follows that it is also the nearest ~O-world. 
Hence, if your belief that O is sensitive, in W you don’t believe that O, 
2 Salerno also accuses Vogel of illegitimately invoking Closure in support Re-
flection (Salerno 2010: 75). Salerno is right that Closure lends no support to 
Reflection, but I can’t see that Vogel is trying to use Closure in this way.
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and a fortiori you don’t believe that B(O) ∧ O either.
This argument doesn’t quite show that your belief that B(O) ∧ O 
is sensitive, but the weaker result it establishes is all we need: if your 
belief that O is sensitive, then your belief that B(O) ∧ O is also sensi-
tive. Hence SC won’t prevent your belief that B(O) ∧ O from attain-
ing the status of knowledge unless it also has the same effect on your 
belief that O. As far as SC is concerned, you can know that B(O) ∧ O 
so long as you know that O.
2 Hetereogeneity
In the preceding section we have seen that the issue of the sensitivity 
of SATs is highly dependent on how we analyse their content. If, on 
the one hand, we analyse them as of the form that you don’t falsely 
believe p (~(B(p) ∧ ~p)), then they are necessarily insensitive.3 If, on 
the other hand, we analyse them as of the form that you believe that p 
truly (B(p) ∧ p), then they will be sensitive so long as your first-order 
belief in p is sensitive.
It might seem, then, that advocates of SC could try to deal with 
the problem of reflective knowledge by taking sides with Becker and 
against Vogel on the question of the correct analysis of SATs. How-
ever, as Guido Melchior has pointed out, the availability of this al-
ternative analysis simply transforms the difficulties faced by SC with 
respect to reflective knowledge. The new problem is this: the propo-
sitions that you believe that p truly and that you don’t believe that p 
falsely are intuitively so similar in content that it is hard to accept 
that the epistemic status of your belief in one will be radically differ-
ent from the epistemic status of your belief in the other. And yet, if 
SC is accepted, this is precisely the situation that we face. Your belief 
that you don’t believe that p falsely cannot be knowledge, whereas, 
so long as your belief that p is sensitive, SC poses no obstacle to 
your belief that you believe that p truly also counting as knowledge. 
Melchior has referred to this as the Heterogeneity Problem (Melchior 
3 Becker has suggested that ~(B(p) ∧ ~p) is not even the best analysis of the 
proposition that your belief that p is not false. He offers B(p) ∧ ~~p as an alterna-
tive (Becker 2006: 82). See also Salerno 2010: 77-79.
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2015).4
I want to suggest, however, that heterogeneity doesn’t sustain a 
cogent argument against SC. To be sure, we should expect your be-
lief that you believe O truly and your belief that you don’t believe O 
falsely to have the same epistemic status, and SC doesn’t deliver on 
this expectation — on the analyses of these propositions that we have con-
sidered. If these analyses were correct, heterogeneity would put pres-
sure on SC, but I’m going to argue that both analyses are incorrect.
Let’s take a closer look at the relationship between B(p) ∧ p and 
~(B(p) ∧ ~p). Their truth values come apart if you don’t believe that 
p. Then B(p) ∧ p is false and ~(B(p) ∧ ~p) is true. But so long as you 
believe that p, their truth values are guaranteed to coincide. Then 
we have that B(p) ∧ p is true if and only if ~(B(p) ∧ ~p) is true if and 
only if p is true.
This suggests that the spurious difference in meaning that results 
from these analyses of SATs is produced by their diverging behav-
iours when the first-order belief doesn’t exist — when you don’t 
believe that p. So the question we need to ask is: what should happen 
to a SAT regarding your belief that p when the belief doesn’t exist? 
According to Vogel’s analysis, the SAT should be true; according to 
Becker’s analysis, it should be false. I want to argue that neither is 
right. If the belief doesn’t exist, the corresponding SAT shouldn’t 
have a truth value. A SAT neither asserts nor denies the existence of 
the belief to which it ascribes truth. Rather, it presupposes its exist-
ence. Your belief that your belief that p is true or not false should be 
true if you believe that p and p is true, false if you believe that p and 
p is false, and lack truth value if you don’t believe that p. A correct 
analysis of SATs should attribute to them this behaviour. Neither of 
the proposals under consideration satisfies this constraint, and the 
4 Melchior adds that the situation generated by SC is made more implausible 
by the fact that B(p) ∧ p is stronger than ~(B(p) ∧ ~p), since the former entails the 
latter but the latter doesn’t entail the former: “We want an account of knowledge 
that allows one to know the weaker propositions d [~(B(p) ∧ ~p] if we know the 
stronger propositions c [B(p) ∧ p]” (Melchior 2015: 483). I’m not sure how much 
weight this additional consideration should carry. Epistemology is full of cases 
in which knowing a weaker proposition seems harder than knowing one that’s 
stronger. Take, for example, the proposition that I’m not an envatted brain and 
the proposition that I have hands.
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appearance of heterogeneity is a consequence of this failure. In order 
to determine the epistemic status that SC ascribes to SATs, we need 
to concentrate on analyses that satisfy this requirement.
3 The predicative analysis
An analysis that satisfies our requirement is readily available if we 
follow the surface grammar of SATs. A SAT, like any other ascrip-
tion of truth to a belief, appears to assert that the belief in question 
instantiates a property or satisfies a condition — the property or 
condition that the predicate ‘…is true’ denotes. In a SAT, the object 
of predication — the belief to which this predicate is ascribed — is 
singled out as the referent of a definite description — as the object 
that satisfies the propositional function x is a belief of mine with the con-
tent that p (Bpx). Hence, if 𝜄x Cx denotes the (unique) x that satisfies propo-
sitional function C, and T stands for the truth predicate, SATs should 
be analysed as of the form T 𝜄x Bpx. Now, in order for the analysis 
to secure the required behaviour for SATs, the definite description 
should be construed along Strawsonian lines, with sentences of the 
form P 𝜄x Cx lacking a truth value if there isn’t a (unique) object sat-
isfying C (Strawson 1950). On this analysis, if you don’t believe that 
p, T 𝜄x Bpx, won’t have a truth value, as desired. Let me refer to this 
as the predicative analysis of SATs.
Let’s consider now how the predicative analysis bears on the ques-
tion of the sensitivity of SATs. As we know, in order for your belief 
that T 𝜄x Bpx to be sensitive, it’s got to be the case that in the near-
est world W in which T 𝜄x Bpx is false you don’t believe T 𝜄x Bpx. Can 
your belief satisfy this condition? Notice, crucially, that the world we 
need to be looking at is not a world in which you don’t believe that 
p. In such a world T 𝜄x Bpx is not false — it lacks a truth value. The 
nearest world W in which T 𝜄x Bpx is false is a world in which you be-
lieve that p but p is false. Since W is the world that most resembles the 
actual world in which you believe that p but p is false, and you believe 
T 𝜄x Bpx in the actual world, we have to conclude that you also believe 
T 𝜄x Bpx in W, since making p false without removing your belief that 
p does not require removing your belief that T 𝜄x Bpx. Hence in the 
nearest world in which T 𝜄x Bpx is false you believe T 𝜄x Bpx. Therefore 
your belief that T 𝜄x Bpx is insensitive. And in general SATs, on the 
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predicative analysis, cannot be sensitive. It follows that, according 
to SC, SATs can’t have the status of knowledge: I can’t know that 
my beliefs are true. If we adopt the predicative analysis of SATs, SC 
renders reflective knowledge impossible.
4 Probabilistic sensitivity
The problem is not restricted to accounts of knowledge that are 
committed to SC. In Scepticism and Reliable Belief, I have defended 
an analysis of knowledge in which sensitivity is not a necessary con-
dition for knowledge, but still plays a major role in the notion. I 
propose that non-standing beliefs (beliefs that we don’t form as a 
result of an innate predisposition that is largely independent of input 
(Zalabardo 2012: 137)) can achieve the status of knowledge either 
by tracking the truth or through the possession by the subject of ad-
equate evidence in their support. Following Sherrilyn Roush (Roush 
2005), I construe truth tracking using, not subjunctive conditionals, 
but conditional probabilities. In this context, the degree of sensi-
tivity of your belief that p is given by the probability of your belief 
that p conditional on p being false — Pr(B(p)|~p): the sensitivity of 
your belief increases as this value decreases. On my analysis, a nec-
essary condition for your belief that p to track the truth is that you 
are significantly more likely to have it if it is true than if it is false. 
More precisely, truth tracking requires that the value of the ratio 
Pr(B(p)|p)/Pr(B(p)|~p) (the tracking ratio of your belief) exceeds a 
certain threshold (Zalabardo 2012: 113-14). The probabilistic rendi-
tion of sensitivity figures in this account of truth tracking in the de-
nominator of the tracking ratio. For any given value for the numera-
tor, a high value for the ratio will be secured with a sufficiently low 
value for the denominator — i.e. by a sufficiently low probability 
that you believe that p if p is false.
On my analysis of truth tracking and the predicative analysis of 
SATs, SATs can’t track the truth. This would require that Pr(B(T 𝜄
x Bpx)|T 𝜄x Bpx) is substantially higher than Pr(B(T 𝜄x Bpx)|~T 𝜄x Bpx). 
But this condition cannot be met for the same reasons that we gave 
to show that, on the predicative analysis, SATs cannot be sensitive. 
On the Strawsonian construal of definite descriptions built into the 
predicative analysis of SATs, the probability that you believe T 𝜄x Bpx 
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if T 𝜄x Bpx is false is the probability that you believe T 𝜄x Bpx if p is false 
and you believe p. But so long as you believe p, the probability that you 
believe T 𝜄x Bpx can be expected to be unaffected by the truth value 
of p. Hence the tracking ratio of a SAT will always be 1. Therefore, 
on my construal of truth tracking, SATs, on the predicative analysis, 
can’t track the truth.
This wouldn’t be a problem if we could have adequate evidence 
for SATs, since I contend that it is in principle possible to have ade-
quate evidence for a proposition p, and hence to know it, even though 
your belief that p doesn’t track the truth (Zalabardo 2012: 63-66). 
But I argue that this is not a viable solution to our problem, since it’s 
not possible to have adequate evidence in support of SATs (Zalab-
ardo 2012: 155-62). It follows that, on the predicative construal of 
SATs, my account of knowledge makes it impossible for SATs to be 
knowledge. My proposal (call it SRB) faces a version of the problem 
of reflective knowledge.5
On the assumption that the predicative analysis of SATs is cor-
rect, we have a powerful argument against SRB. However, the con-
nection cuts both ways. To the extent that SRB is independently sup-
ported, we have at our disposal a powerful reason for abandoning the 
predicative analysis in favour of alternatives for which the problem 
doesn’t arise. The argument would go like this:
(1) If SRB is the right account of knowledge and the predicative 
analysis of SATs is correct, then reflective knowledge is im-
possible.
(2) SRB is the right account of knowledge.
(3) Reflective knowledge is possible.
Therefore
(4) The predicative analysis of SATs is incorrect.
Call this the fightback argument. I think that premise (1) is incon-
testable, and premise (3) is highly plausible. I also believe premise 
5 Adam Leite has argued that the problem can be solved by thinking of SATs 
as standing beliefs (Leite 2014: 161). I don’t think Leite’s proposal is satisfactory. 
See Zalabardo 2014: 196.
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(2). Hence I think this is a sound argument against the predicative 
analysis. But for the argument to work, there needs to be a plausible 
alternative analysis of SATs for which SRB doesn’t face the problem 
of reflective knowledge. If this alternative analysis couldn’t be found 
— if there were no plausible analyses of SATs for which SRB doesn’t 
face the problem of reflective knowledge, then it would be hard to 
resist the conclusion that the problem rests, not with our analysis of 
SATs, but with my analysis of knowledge. My goal in the remainder 
is to fill this gap — to identify a plausible analysis of SATs for which 
SRB doesn’t face the problem of reflective knowledge.
5 Deflationism
The most visible alternative to the predicative analysis is deflation-
ism. According to deflationism, a SAT has the same content as its 
object of predication. The content of your belief that your belief that 
p is true is identical to the content of your belief that p. Contrary to 
what the surface grammar suggests, your belief that your belief that 
the cat is hungry is true is not about the instantiation of a property 
(truth) by one of your beliefs — it is about the instantiation of a 
property (hunger) by the cat. It has the same cognitive content as your 
belief that the cat is hungry.
The only difference between the two beliefs is that the former, 
but not the latter, carries an existential commitment to your belief 
that the cat is hungry. Adapting Hartry Field’s terminology, we can 
characterise the resulting relationship between the two beliefs by 
saying that their cognitive equivalence is relative to the existence of 
your belief that the cat is hungry, where relative cognitive equiva-
lence is to be understood as follows:
To say that A is cognitively equivalent to B relative to C means that the 
conjunction of A and C is cognitively equivalent to the conjunction of 
B and C; so that as long as C is presupposed we can treat A and B as 
equivalent. (Field 1994: 250)
So long as it is presupposed that you believe that the cat is hungry, 
we can treat the two beliefs as equivalent. This gives to your belief 
that your belief that the cat is hungry is true the truth conditions that 
we expect from a SAT: true if you believe truly that the cat is hungry, 
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false if you believe falsely that the cat is hungry, and neither true nor 
false if you don’t believe that the cat is hungry, as in this case the 
existential commitment of your belief that your belief that the cat is 
hungry is true is not satisfied.6
On the analysis of SATs that we obtain from the deflationist ac-
count, the problem of reflective knowledge doesn’t arise. The con-
tent of your belief that your belief that the cat is hungry is true is the 
same as the content of your belief that the cat is hungry. It follows 
that they both will have the same epistemic status. If you know that 
things are as your belief that the cat is hungry represents them as be-
ing, then you must also know that things are as your belief that your 
belief that the cat is hungry is true represents them as being, since 
the way the latter represents things as being is identical with the way 
the former represents things as being. We have one, not two, pos-
sible items of knowledge.
It seems then that deflationism provides what the fightback argu-
ment requires — an analysis of SATs on which SRB doesn’t face the 
problem of reflective knowledge. This enables the advocate of SRB 
to blame the problem on a defective analysis of SATs, and save her 
account of knowledge by endorsing the deflationist alternative to the 
predicative analysis.
This is not a route I would like to take. Epistemological dividends 
notwithstanding, I believe that the deflationist account of truth faces 
serious obstacles. If it turned out that saving SRB from the problem 
of reflective knowledge required endorsing deflationism, I would be 
inclined to join others in concluding that the problem of reflective 
knowledge is a symptom of a defective epistemology. This is not the 
place to undertake a serious assessment of deflationism, but I want to 
indicate briefly in the next section the general source of my misgiv-
ings about the view.
6 Truth and meaning
My reservations arise from a consequence of deflationism first high-
lighted by Michael Dummett:
It now appears that if we accept the redundancy theory of ‘true’ and 
6 See also Peter Strawson’s analysis of truth ascriptions in Strawson 1949.
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‘false’ […] we must abandon the idea which we naturally have that 
the notions of truth and falsity play an essential role in any account of 
the meaning of statements in general or of the meaning of a particular 
statement. (Dummett 1978: 7)
The “idea which we naturally have” is one that I find very plau-
sible: in order to explain the power of statements or beliefs to rep-
resent things as being a certain way, we will need to invoke, as a 
crucial part of our explanans, the idea that statements and beliefs 
are made true or false by how things stand. In order to understand 
what it means for statements or beliefs to represent things as being a 
certain way, we first need to understand what it means to assess them 
according to whether the way they represent things as being agrees 
with the way things are — we need to understand, in other words, 
what it means to assess them as true or false. I am going to refer to 
assessment of beliefs, statements and similar items as true or false as 
alethic assessment. And I’m going to refer to the claim that our account 
of representation must be built on our account of alethic assessment 
as the principle of alethic priority. I am not going to defend alethic pri-
ority here. The principle will figure in my argument as a premise.7
Dummett’s point is that alethic priority is incompatible with 
deflationism.8 If our account of alethic assessment is going to con-
tribute to our account of the representational features of statements 
or beliefs, then our account of alethic assessment can’t invoke the 
representational features of these items. But this is precisely what 
deflationism does. Deflationism explains what it means to assess a 
belief as true in terms of the representational features of the belief. It 
explains the content of your belief that your belief that the cat is hun-
gry is true in terms of (as identical with) the content of your belief 
that the cat is hungry. Hence the attempt to combine alethic priority 
with deflationism produces a vicious circle of explanation:
in order that someone should gain from the explanation that P is true 
in such-and-such circumstances an understanding of the sense of P, he 
must already know what it means to say that P is true. If when he en-
quires into this he is told that the only explanation is that to say that P is 
7 For a recent attack on alethic priority, see Rumfitt 2014.
8 See Collins 2002 for an interesting discussion of this point.
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true is the same as to assert P, it will follow that in order to understand 
what is meant by saying that P is true, he must already know the sense 
of asserting P, which was precisely what was supposed to be explained 
to him. (Dummett 1978: 7)
The incompatibility of deflationism with alethic priority is read-
ily accepted by the leading deflationists. Their reaction is, under-
standably, to reject alethic priority. Thus, according to Hartry Field,
[…] the main idea behind deflationism […] requires […] that what 
plays a central role in meaning and content not include truth condi-
tions (or relations to propositions, where propositions are conceived as 
encapsulating truth conditions). (Field 1994: 253)9
Field uses verificationism as an illustration of the kind of account 
that might be used by the deflationist to explain the content of sen-
tences. Horwich mentions assertibility conditions in this connection 
(Horwich 1990: 73), and, more recently, patterns of sentence ac-
ceptance that provide the causal-explanatory basis for our overall use 
of words (Horwich 2005: 49-50). What matters for our purposes is 
that all these proposals violate the principle of alethic priority, and 
that only accounts that violate the principle are compatible with de-
flationism. I want to uphold alethic priority. That’s why I must reject 
deflationism.
Where does this leave us? We saw in Section 4 that the fightback 
argument requires that we identify a plausible alternative to the pre-
dicative analysis of SATs for which SRB doesn’t face the problem of 
reflective knowledge. We then saw in Section 5 that on the defla-
tionist analysis of SATs the problem of reflective knowledge does 
not arise. But in this section we’ve seen that if one wants to uphold 
alethic priority, as I do, endorsing deflationism is not an option. This 
still leaves us in need of an alternative to the predicative analysis 
to underpin the fightback argument. What we are looking for is 
an analysis of SATs that frees SRB from the problem of reflective 
knowledge without violating alethic priority.
9 See also Horwich 1990: 71-74.
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7 Explicating alethic assessment
We obtained the deflationist alternative to the predicative analysis 
from an account of alethic assessment — restricted to the first-per-
son present case, i.e. of the content of beliefs in which you assess 
as true your own current beliefs. The deflationist explains the con-
tent of these assessments as identical with the content of the assessed 
beliefs. I am rejecting this approach on the grounds that it violates 
alethic priority. What we are after is an account of alethic assess-
ment that abides by alethic priority but doesn’t force us to adopt the 
predicative analysis of SATs.
A very natural strategy for explicating alethic assessment violates 
the second requirement. One way to explain the meaning of assess-
ing Xs as Ys is to specify what an X has to be like in order to qualify 
as a Y — the condition that an X has to satisfy in order for this assess-
ment to be correct. The strategy I have in mind applies this general 
template to alethic assessment: we explain what it means to assess a 
belief as true by specifying the condition that a belief has to satisfy in 
order to count as true. I’m going to refer to this strategy for explicat-
ing alethic assessment as representationalism. The representationalist 
strategy can be implemented in many different ways. One prominent 
option is to think of belief as a relation to sentences of a language or 
language-like medium of representation, and to specify the condi-
tion that makes a belief true in terms of a Tarski-style theory of truth 
for these sentences, based on a theory of reference for their terms. 
But this is not by any means the only option available to the repre-
sentationalist. An account of what makes a belief true in terms of, 
say, coherence, or end-of-enquiry consensus, would also sustain a 
representationalist account of alethic assessment.10
10 It’s an interesting question whether a deflationist account of truth could 
also give rise to a version of representationalism. I think the question has to be 
answered in the negative if deflationism satisfies the condition that Field imposes 
on the view if it is to be at all interesting: “it must claim not merely that what plays 
a central role in meaning and content not include truth conditions under that de-
scription, but that it not include anything that could possibly constitute a reduction of truth 
conditions to other more physicalistic terms” (Field 1994: 253). However, it seems to 
me that Paul Horwich’s account of meaning doesn’t satisfy this condition, and can 
give rise to a representationalist explication of alethic assessment. See Horwich 
2005, especially Chapter 2.
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The problem with any kind of representationalism, for our pur-
poses, is that it enjoins the predicative analysis of SATs. If we expli-
cate alethic assessment by specifying the condition that a belief has to 
satisfy in order to count as true, then a SAT can only be a belief to the 
effect that this condition is satisfied by one of your current beliefs, as 
the predicative analysis dictates. If we want to find an alternative to 
the predicative analysis of SATs, we need to adopt a non-representa-
tionalist strategy for explicating alethic assessment.
In the remainder I’m going to explore an alternative to the repre-
sentationalist strategy for which I’m going to use the label pragmatism. 
The pragmatist rejects the representationalist project of explicating 
alethic assessment with a specification of the condition that a belief 
has to satisfy in order to be assessed as true. What the pragmatist 
proposes instead is to render alethic assessments intelligible with a 
specification of the rules that govern the practice of assessing beliefs 
in this way. For the pragmatist, alethic assessment is assessment that 
follows these rules, and ‘true’ is the label that we apply to beliefs or 
other items in order to express a favourable assessment according to 
these rules. In the next section I’m going to outline a proposal as to 
which rules we should take to define alethic assessment. I’m going 
to refer to this specific pragmatist account of alethic assessment as 
empiricist pragmatism.11
8 Empiricist pragmatism12
I’m going to concentrate in the first instance on alethic assessment, 
not of beliefs, but of the episodes that we think of as conscious mani-
festations of belief — conscious episodes in which we take ourselves 
to represent things as being a certain way.13 I’m going to refer to 
these episodes as judgments, although the term sometimes carries a 
connotation of voluntariness or spontaneity that will be absent from 
11 The label is meant to mark the contrast with Robert Brandom’s rationalist 
pragmatism (Brandom 2000: 11). For the contrast see Zalabardo 2016, Section 5.
12 This section overlaps with Zalabardo 2016.
13 Brandom’s rationalist pragmatism focuses in the first instance on assertion, 
as the linguistic correlate of judgment (Brandom 1994: 153). Brandom’s reasons 
for taking this line do not apply to my proposal.
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my account. My characterisation of the rules that govern alethic as-
sessment of judgments will rest on some substantial assumptions 
about the nature of judgments. But since we want the resulting ac-
count to abide by the principle of alethic priority, our assumptions 
regarding the phenomenon cannot include semantic features — the 
fact that they represent things as being a certain way.
I want to take as my starting point David Hume’s characterisa-
tion of the episodes that I’m calling judgments, but he identifies with 
beliefs, in the Appendix to the Treatise. He writes:
belief consists merely in a certain feeling or sentiment; in something, 
that depends not on the will, but must arise from certain determi-
nate causes and principles, of which we are not masters. When we are 
convinc’d of any matter of fact, we do nothing but conceive it, along 
with a certain feeling, different from what attends the mere reveries of 
the imagination. (Hume 1978: 624)
Belief, according to Hume, then, is a conscious involuntary reac-
tion. What it is a reaction to is not, in the first instance, the possible 
state of affairs that the belief represents as obtaining, but the idea 
that serves as its representative in the mind:
an opinion or belief is nothing but an idea, that is different from a fic-
tion […] in the manner of its being conceiv’d. (Hume 1978: 628)
An idea assented to feels different from a fictitious idea, that the fancy 
alone presents to us. (Hume 1978: 629)14
I want to focus on the phenomenon that Hume highlights, not 
as an account of belief, but as the basis for a characterisation of the 
kind of conscious episodes that I’m calling judgments. Judgments will 
have the basic character that Hume ascribes to beliefs — they are 
conscious episodes in which a mental item produces an involuntary 
reaction.
I am going to use the term conviction for the conscious, involun-
tary, re-identifiable reaction (Hume’s feeling or sentiment) that fig-
ures in judgments. I’m going to complicate Hume’s picture slightly 
14 I am not adopting Hume’s account of the difference between these episodes 
and those in which a possible state of affairs is merely imagined, in terms of “a 
superior force, or vivacity, or solidity, or firmness, or steadiness” (Hume 1978: 629).
163Reflective Knowledge and the Nature of Truth
by contemplating negative conviction, as the feeling associated with 
things not being as represented in consciousness, as well as positive 
conviction. I will refer to judgments as either positive or negative, 
depending on the sign of the conviction that figures in them. I want 
to emphasize that I’m thinking of conviction as a feeling. Conviction 
doesn’t ascribe a property or concept to a possible state of affairs or 
to its mental representative,15 nor is it the undertaking of a com-
mitment of any kind. It is simply an involuntary feeling that some 
conscious items provoke.16 Conceiving of conviction along these 
lines doesn’t require assuming that it has a particularly rich phenom-
enology. There doesn’t have to be a collection of phenomenological 
features that are present precisely in those conscious episodes that 
involve conviction. All that’s required is that the subject has the abil-
ity to re-identify this feeling. Its type-identity conditions can then be 
defined in terms of the subject’s verdicts.
To the conscious items that judgments are reactions to, I am go-
ing to refer as conscious sentences. They will be the representatives in 
the stream of consciousness of the possible states of affairs that we 
take judgments to represent as obtaining, leaving out of the picture 
for now the possible semantic properties of these mental entities. 
Like the sentences of a natural or formal language, they exhibit syn-
tactic, combinatorial structure, being produced by the combination 
of constituents (conscious terms) according to specific patterns. Like 
Hume’s ideas, conscious sentences will figure in conscious episodes 
other than judgments, including the conscious, episodic correlates of 
desire (the kind of conscious episode that occurs, for example, when 
you obey the order to close your eyes and make a wish) or episodes 
in which we merely consider in consciousness a way for things to be, 
without taking any attitude towards it.17
15 Hume considers and rejects this option, as the view that “belief is some 
new idea, such as that of reality or existence, which we join to the simple conception of an 
object” (Hume 1978: 623).
16 See in this connection Horgan and Timmons’ discussion of the phenomeno-
logical dimension of what they call occurrent beliefs in Horgan and Timmons 2006. 
See also Jonathan Cohen notion of credal feelings (Cohen 1992).
17 Notice that what I am calling conscious sentences are importantly differ-
ent from the sentences of the language of thought postulated by the represen-
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Conscious sentences may appear spontaneously in the stream 
of consciousness, or they might be produced voluntarily. When a 
conscious sentence figures in the stream of consciousness, we may 
feel towards it positive conviction, negative conviction, or neither.18 
Which of these obtains in each case is not under the control of the 
will, but, as Hume indicates, it’s not a random matter either — con-
viction arises “from certain determinate causes and principles”. To 
judge, on my pre-semantic construal, is simply to feel conviction to-
wards a conscious sentence.
I have characterised conscious sentences as certain re-identifia-
ble items that can be brought to consciousness voluntarily or appear 
there spontaneously, and conviction as a specific involuntary reac-
tion that we may or may not feel towards a conscious sentence that 
we are entertaining. Judgments are the episodes in which this reac-
tion is produced. We think of conscious sentences and judgments as 
representing things as being a certain way, but our characterisation 
of these phenomena doesn’t presuppose that they have this power. 
Hence by invoking this characterisation of judgments in our account 
of alethic assessment we won’t be violating alethic priority.
A pragmatist account of alethic assessment of conscious sentences 
and the judgments in which they figure will proceed by specifying 
a collection of rules such that an assessment practice will count as 
alethic just in case it is governed by these rules. According to em-
piricist pragmatism, the practice of alethic assessment is governed by 
three rules: the Basic Rule, the Ascent Rule and the Interpretation 
Rule.
According to the Basic Rule, alethic assessment is necessarily 
driven by conviction. To assess conscious sentences in any other way 
is not to assess them as true or false:
tational theory of mind. Conscious sentences, unlike sentences of the language 
of thought, are essentially conscious, enjoying no ontological status beyond the 
conscious episodes in which they figure.
18 Conviction comes in degrees, and the phenomenon might be more accu-
rately represented as a continuum between 1 and 0, with .5 as the complete ab-
sence of positive or negative conviction. However, I’m going to proceed, for the 
sake of simplicity, as if there were sharp boundaries between the presence of each 
type of conviction and their absence.
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Basic Rule: Assess a conscious sentence as true if and only if it 
produces positive conviction; assess a conscious sentence as false 
if and only if it produces negative conviction.
Notice the parallel with some expressivist accounts of specific re-
gions of discourse. According to a version of expressivism concern-
ing moral discourse, to assess an action as morally right or wrong 
is to assess it according to your moral sentiments — to assess it as 
morally right when it produces moral approval in you and as morally 
wrong when it produces moral disapproval.19
Clearly the basic rule by itself doesn’t provide a sufficient char-
acterisation of alethic assessment. One major limitation is that it is 
compatible with a highly implausible subjectivism, as it makes no 
provision for treating as incorrect a judgment that follows the sub-
ject’s convictions. We can see this in the first instance with respect 
to one’s past judgments. A subject can presumably entertain a con-
scious sentence on two different occasions, and it is perfectly possi-
ble that it produces conviction on one occasion but not on the other, 
or that it produces positive conviction on one occasion and negative 
conviction on the other. This might happen as a result of changes 
either in the subject’s state of information or in the processes that 
determine the production of conviction in her.
The Basic Rule gives no grounds for treating judgments of op-
posite signs concerning a single conscious sentence as incompatible 
with one another, or one’s previous judgments as false. The Basic 
Rule by itself would confer on alethic assessment the behaviour of 
forms of assessment for which a subjectivist construal is perfectly 
adequate. Consider, for example, the plausible view that to assess an 
ice-cream flavour as delicious or revolting is to assess it according to 
your culinary taste — as delicious if it gives you gustatory pleasure 
and as revolting if it gives you gustatory displeasure. Tastes change 
and you might find that if you follow this rule you end up assessing 
pistachio ice-cream as revolting on one occasion and as delicious a 
19 The claim that I’m focusing on is that assessment of actions has to be con-
ducted in this way in order to count as moral assessment, not the claim that the 
role of moral discourse is to express moral sentiments or a claim to the effect that 
a moral assessment is correct just in case it accords with the moral sentiments of 
the assessor.
José L. Zalabardo166
few years later. There is no obvious sense in which these assessments 
are in conflict with one another. If the Basic Rule were the only rule 
governing alethic assessment, we’d have to treat in the same way the 
situation in which a subject goes from assessing a conscious sentence 
as true to assessing it as false.
In order to address this issue, we need to introduce a rule that 
enables us to go from assessments of conscious sentences to assess-
ments of judgments:
Ascent Rule: Assess a positive judgment of a conscious sentence as 
true and a negative judgment of the sentence as false if and only if 
you assess the conscious sentence as true; assess a positive judg-
ment of a conscious sentence as false and a negative judgment of 
the sentence as true if and only if you assess the conscious sen-
tence as false.20
In order to abide by this rule, a subject who now feels negative 
conviction towards a conscious sentence but remembers feeling posi-
tive conviction towards the same sentence in the past will also have 
to assess as false her past judgment. The same would go for a subject 
who now feels positive conviction towards a conscious sentence but 
remembers feeling negative conviction towards it.
Notice that this feature of alethic assessment resembles a parallel 
feature of moral assessment. When we assess an action as morally 
right, we also assess as morally right moral approval of the action 
and we assess as morally wrong moral disapproval of it. Likewise, 
when we assess an action as morally wrong, we also assess as morally 
right moral disapproval of the action and we assess as morally wrong 
moral approval of it.
The practice described by the Basic Rule and the Ascent Rule 
still has a very important limitation — it imposes no restrictions on 
how I should assess the judgments of others. The limitation wouldn’t 
exist if we could make sense of the idea that one of your conscious 
sentences is identical to one of mine, but it is hard to see how this 
could be achieved. For a single subject, we can think of the identity 
20 This formulation of the rule presupposes that the sentences in question have 
no indexical features. Dealing with indexicality would require a more sophisti-
cated approach. The same goes for the next rule.
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conditions of conscious sentences as given by the subject’s inclina-
tions — two conscious episodes involve the same conscious sentence 
just in case it seems to the subject that they do. For inter-personal 
identity there is no obvious correlate for this approach.
A plausible account of the rules that govern alethic assessment 
would have to impose conditions on our assessment of the judgments 
of others. It is an essential feature of the practice that we can assess 
as true or false the judgments of others, and there are some condi-
tions that these third-person assessments have to satisfy in order to 
count as alethic. The basic intuitive idea of the rule we need is very 
simple: in order for your assessment to count as alethic assessment, 
you need to assess as true those judgments of others that agree with 
yours, and you need to assess as false those judgments of others that 
disagree with yours.
Unfortunately, however, the rule cannot be formulated in these 
simple terms, as invoking at this point the idea of someone else’s 
judgment agreeing or disagreeing with one of yours would render 
the account incompatible with the principle of alethic priority. In or-
der for your judgment to agree or disagree with mine, the way things 
are represented as being by the conscious sentence that produces 
your conviction has to coincide with the way things are represented 
as being by the conscious sentence that produces mine. Availing our-
selves of this notion would amount to invoking semantic features of 
judgments in our account of alethic assessment.
The way forward for the pragmatist at this point is to invoke the 
phenomenon of interpretation.21 We have introduced conscious sen-
tences as the representatives in the stream of consciousness of pos-
sible states of affairs and the immediate objects of conviction. But 
conscious sentences play an important additional role: we use them 
to index or tag the representational states of others, including their 
judgments and the beliefs they manifest, in the procedure that we 
21 I think there are important similarities between the role that interpretation 
plays in this construal of alethic assessment and the role that it plays, according to 
Donald Davidson, in the concept of truth (Davidson 1990: 295-96). John Collins 
offers an insightful summary of Davidson’s line of reasoning on this point (Collins 
2002: 520). For a defence of the pragmatist character of Davidson’s position, see 
Rorty 1986.
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refer to as interpretation.22 We can think of these indexings as con-
scious sentences that embed other conscious sentences, postulating 
a relation between our interpretee’s judgment and the embedded 
conscious sentence. These interpretative conscious sentences, like 
our other conscious sentences, may or may not produce conviction, 
positive or negative, when they are brought to consciousness.
The judgments that we interpret as agreeing with ours are those 
that we index with conscious sentences towards which we feel con-
viction of the same sign (positive or negative); the ones that we inter-
pret as disagreeing with ours are those that we index with conscious 
sentences towards which we feel conviction of the opposite sign.23 
This feature of the practice is represented in our final rule:
Interpretation Rule: Assess someone else’s positive judgment as true 
and someone else’s negative judgment as false if and only if you 
have indexed it with a conscious sentence that produces positive 
conviction in you. Assess someone else’s positive judgment as 
false and someone else’s negative judgment as true if and only if 
you have indexed it with a conscious sentence that produces nega-
tive conviction in you.24
9 Empiricist pragmatism and the fightback argument
Empiricist pragmatism proposes to take the Basic Rule, the Ascent 
Rule and the Interpretation Rule as defining the practice of alethic 
22 For the picture of interpretation as an indexing exercise, see Churchland 
1979: 100-7. In Churchland’s version of the approach, the items that serve as 
indices are propositions, but he sees viability as independent of any special view 
concerning the nature of propositions. He thinks the approach would work even 
if we thought of propositions as sentences.
23 Huw Price has highlighted the need for a rule along these lines in the char-
acterisation of our conversational practice (Price 2011: 164).
24 This formulation of the rule would still be at odds with alethic priority if 
interpretation were defined in terms of the goal of matching the judgments of 
others with conscious sentences of yours that are synonymous with the conscious 
sentences that serve as the objects of those judgments. The proposal needs to 
employ a construal of interpretation on which its goal is not defined in semantic 
terms. See Zalabardo 2016 for further discussion.
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assessment. To assess judgments as true or false is, the pragmatist 
claims, to assess them according to these rules.25 The approach satis-
fies our criteria. Notice, first, that it sustains an analysis of SATs that 
doesn’t pose the problem of reflective knowledge. Alethic assess-
ment of your own current judgments necessarily follows the con-
victions that figure in these judgments — positive judgments can 
only be assessed as true; negative judgments can only be assessed as 
false. Assessments that depart from this pattern simply don’t qualify 
as alethic. It follows that if we think of alethic assessments as judg-
ments, then your alethic assessment of one of your current judgments 
(i.e. a SAT) will have to be treated as having the same content as the 
target judgment — the way the assessment represents things as be-
ing will have to coincide with the way the target judgment represents 
things as being. Hence, if you know that things stand as the target 
judgment represents them, there is no further question of whether 
you know that they stand as your alethic assessment — your SAT 
— represents them. The problem of reflective knowledge doesn’t 
arise. But, second, this is achieved without violating alethic priority, 
since the pragmatist explication of alethic assessment doesn’t invoke 
semantic features of judgments. Truth, as construed by empiricist 
pragmatism, can then figure in our account of the content of judg-
ments without circularity.
We’ve seen that the advocate of SRB could try to defuse the 
threat of the problem of reflective knowledge with the fightback ar-
gument, arguing that the problem arises from an inadequate analysis 
of SATs. But pursuing this strategy requires identifying an alterna-
tive to the predicative analysis of SATs for which the problem doesn’t 
arise. Deflationism can play this role so long as we are prepared to 
forsake alethic priority. Empiricist pragmatism serves the same pur-
pose without paying this price. For the advocate of SRB (or SC) and 
alethic priority, the problem of reflective knowledge provides sup-
port for empiricist pragmatism.26
25 See Zalabardo 2016 for some ways in which the proposal will need to be 
fine-tuned.
26 I am grateful to Josep Corbí and Jordi Valor for inviting me to take part in the 
1st Blasco Disputatio. The present paper is not so much my contribution to the sym-
posium as an attempt to address concerns raised by my co-symposiast, Marian David. 
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